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INTRODUCTION
The Respondents the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization (the "County") and Utah
State Tax Commission ("Commission") argue that the Commission correctly "'implied'" that
Petitioner Action TV's ("Action") "rent-to-own" personal property ("Property") was properly
assessed as "escaped property" (County Brief at 9, quoting Adams v. Bd. of Review of Indus.
Comm % 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)), and also assert that the Commission "made
sufficient findings in support of its decision to uphold Salt Lake County's use of [a] five year
life" to value Action's Property. Commission Brief at 11. Neither submission withstands
scrutiny.
Abundant authority (ignored by Respondents) establishes that Action cannot be taxed by
"implication." Compare Section I, below, with County Brief at 9 (a "'finding'" regarding the
taxability of property '"may be implied if it is clear from the record'") {quoting Adams, 821 P.2d
at 4). The Commission, furthermore, made absolutely no findings to support a five-year "life"
for Action's Property. The record and the Commission's own decision, moreover, demonstrate
that Action's Property is not properly assessable on the basis of a five-year "useful life." The
Internal Revenue Service recognizes that the "useful life" of "rent-to-own" property is exhausted
in three years, 92% of all "rent-to-own" companies in the country reject a five-year "useful life"
for financial and tax purposes, and even the Commission acknowledges that Action "disposed of
the items at issue within three years of acquiring them." Commission Final Decision' at 3 (App.
A to Action's Opening Brief) ("Final Decision"). Once "disposed o f {id.) by Action,
"rent-to-own" property either becomes household furnishings or "junk" - neither of which is
subject to property taxation. Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 2(8). Therefore, Action's Property cannot
be valued on the basis of a five-year "useful life." Section II, below.
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I.

ACTION'S PROPERTY IS NOT ASSESSABLE
AS "ESCAPED PROPERTY"

The lynchpin of the County's and the Commission's submissions regarding the
assessability of Action's Property is that the Commission made "adequate" "findings of fact" to
support its legal conclusion "that Action's rental property is escaped property." County Brief at
5-9 (emphasis deleted); accord, Commission Brief at 16-21. Crucial to this position is the
assertion that any factual or legal omissions in the Commission's analysis '"may be implied.'"
County Brief at 9 {quoting Adams, 821 P.2d at 5). These assertions, however, blithely ignore
two important realities. First, no taxpayer can be taxed by "implication." Second, the
Commission simply did not make the finding necessary to establish that Action's Property is
properly assessable as "escaped property" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8).
The assessability of Action's Property cannot be established by implication. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-102(8) is a taxing statute as it authorizes counties to assess "escaped" property.
Accordingly, long recognized legal principles demand that the statute be construed in favor of
the taxpayer. "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend
their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are
construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." Gould v. Gould,
245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) (emphasis added). This rule has long been applied by Utah courts.
Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm % 845 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Gould,
245 U.S. at 153) ("Under traditional rules of statutory construction, tax statutes are strictly
construed in favor of the taxpayer so as to avoid the levying of taxes by implication. 'In case of
doubt they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen"');
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Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1958) (citing
Gould, 245 U.S. at 153) ("We concede that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and in
favor of the taxpayer where doubtful"); see also Superior Soft Water v. State Tax Comrn'n, 843
P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Pacific Intermountain Express, 329 P.2d at 651).1
The Commission's brief correctly points out that, in order to qualify as assessable
'•escaped property" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a)(ii), "two questions must be asked."
Commission Brief at 17.
First, whether the property was either undervalued or omitted from
the tax rolls. And second, whether the undervaluation or omission
was the result of the property owner's failure to comply with the
reporting requirements. If the answer to each question is yes, the
conclusion must be that the property escaped assessment.
Id. While the County and the Commission assert that the State Tax Commission properly
answered "yes" to both of the above queries, the Tax Commission's decision (and the record in
this case) unequivocally establish, not only that the Tax Commission did not answer the second
question, but that the answer to that inquiry is no.
To begin with, there is absolutely no "finding" anywhere in the Tax Commission's
decision that Action failed to comply with a reporting requirement imposed by the Utah Code. If
requested by a county assessor, a taxpayer may be required to submit a signed affidavit "setting
forth all the [assessable] real and personal property . . . which is owned, possessed, managed, or

1

Accord, Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989) ("Our
practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the
legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists"); Ogden Union
Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 395 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 1964) ("Problems of
semantics are always difficult, especially where no specific meaning is assigned to them in the
statutes, and we are to resolve doubts in favor of the taxpayer").
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under the control of the [taxpayer] at 12 o'clock noon on January 1." Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-306(1). But, Action timely filed all relevant personal property affidavits, and included
within those affidavits all property that Action (or anyone else for that matter) reasonably
believed at that time to be "assessable."2 There is, furthermore, no evidence and there are no
assertions that Action made any effort to evade its property tax obligations by filing inaccurate or
incomplete property tax affidavits. R. at 905, 909, 937, 943, 956, 974.
The record, moreover, simply refutes any possible assertion that Action could have
behaved differently than it did in completing and filing its property tax affidavits. During the
years in question, there was great confusion within and without the "rent-to-own" industry including among state and county taxing officials - regarding the assessability of "rent-to-own"
property. In fact, each member of the "rent-to-own" industry in Utah understood Utah reporting
requirements differently, some based their understanding upon inquiry to county assessing
officials and some based it upon advice from their professional advisors, and each industry
member reported their "rent-to-own" property on a different basis. R. 834-837, 887, 893, 908,
928, 958-959, 962, 969, 988-989. And, up to and including 1996, the county assessor had not
audited or assessed any other "rent-to-own" business in Salt Lake County for "escaped property"
2

There is no evidence in the record that any policy or practice regarding the assessability of
"rent-to-own" property existed prior to 1994, and if so, what that policy was. The Tax
Commission's personal property tax guidelines regarding the issue were not properly
promulgated pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act (U.C.A.§ 63-46a-l et seq.)
until 1996. County assessors were unable to follow the directions given by the Commission.
"Rent-to-own" taxpayers were apparently required to use a form (Form TC-595) that neither the
county nor the Commission knew from where it was derived or how it was to be used, and which
form has since been withdrawn by the Commission. Lastly, county assessors themselves were
simply in the dark, as evidenced by the county assessors^ July 10, 1996 request to the
Commission for an advisory ruling concerning whether and how "rent-to-own" property should
be assessed. Action's Opening Brief at 24-26.
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under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(8). R. 89, 496, 837-838, 952-954. See also note 2, above. In
1994, Action essentially became the county's "guinea pig" to determine how these provisions
should be interpreted. As a result of the passage of time, no other member of the "rent-to-own"
industry will be subjected to an escaped property audit for the 1989-1993 period for which
Action has been assessed, and they may not be subject to an escaped property assessment for any
subsequent year because the Action audit in 1994 put them on notice and provided them an
opportunity to conform their reporting practices to the County's specifications announced in the
1994 Action audit.
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Tax Commission did not make a
finding that Action's property had been "omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the
taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-2-102(8)(a)(ii).3 The Commission failed to make this finding because the facts do not
support such a finding. Action fully complied with all applicable reporting requirements. The
legal outcome of this case, therefore, as even the Commission concedes, is inescapable: Action's
"rent-to-own" property is not "escaped property" because the omission of that property did not
result from "the property owner's failure to comply with the reporting requirements."
Commission Brief at 17 (interpreting the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a)(ii)).

The County asserts that the Commission's findings were "adequate," and cites nine
"findings" that purportedly support application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8). See, e.g.,
County Brief at 10. Not one of the County's nine "implied" findings (County Brief at 9-10),
however, consists of a statement that Action's property was "omitted" as a result of "failure of
the taxpayer to comply with the [applicable] reporting requirements." Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-102(8)(a)(ii). The "findings" created by the County, therefore, are not "adequate." County
Brief at 10.
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This result is necessary to prevent unjust and inequitable application of the Utah Code.
As Action explained in its opening brief (at 26):
Subsection [59-2-102](8)(a)(ii) was not intended to apply in
situations where general confusion exists as to the interpretation
and application of law. To hold otherwise would mean that
taxpayers may be subjected to an "escaped property" assessment
every time the Commission or any court reviewing a Commission
decision enters a decision against another taxpayer on a novel
theory of tax law argued by a county or state taxing authority.
The Respondents do not directly address the inequity inherent in their position. They
simply argue that any possible factual or legal omission in the Commission's decision "'may be
implied if it is clear from the record.'" County Brief at 9 (quoting Adams, 821 P.2d at 5). The
only thing "'clear from the record,'" of course, is that Action complied with the reporting
requirements of the Utah Code. Id. But, even if this point were less clear, the Respondents'
"analysis" merely brings the Court back to the fundamental rule that taxpayers may not be taxed
by implication. See note 1 and accompanying text, above. This unavoidable, bedrock principle
is the beginning and end of this case.
Utah Code § 59-2-102(8)(a)(ii) establishes that Action's Property can be assessed as
"escaped property" only if the Commission properly finds that Action's Property was "omitted
from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting
requirements of this chapter." That finding was not - and cannot - be made here. Note 3, above.
Nor can such a finding be supplied by "implication." Note 1, above. The Commission's
decision, therefore, must be reversed.
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II.

ACTION'S PROPERTY DOES NOT HAVE A "FIVE YEAR LIFE"

The Respondents submit that the Commission "made adequate findings" to support its
use of a five-year "life" to value Action's property. Commission Brief at 11. Accord, County
Brief at 13-16. What this submission ignores, of course, is the reality that the Tax Commission
made no findings regarding the propriety of a five-year valuation "life."4 Nor could the
Commission make such findings because the county has never conducted an appraisal or review
of Action's "rent-to-own" property (or any other company's "rent-to-own" property for that
matter). The county did nothing more than mathematically apply the Tax Commission's personal
property tax guidelines to the original cost of the various items as reflected on Action's books. R.
954-965, 963, 969, 973. Even more importantly, the record - and the Tax Commission's own
decision - demonstrate that the use of a five-year "life" to value Action's property is clearly
erroneous.
At the outset, Action notes the rich irony inherent in Respondents' disingenuous
argument that the Commission's five-year "life" must be affirmed because Action somehow
"failed" to present an alternative valuation. Commission Brief at 7-11; County Brief at 20.
Omitted from Respondents' discussion, of course, is the fact that the county assessor never
viewed, appraised, or made any effort to ascertain the actual value of Action's "rent-to-own"
property, or any other similar "rent-to-own" property. R. 954-956, 963, 969, 973. Action, by
contrast, presented substantial evidence. First, from an expert witness, a certified personal
property appraiser, who appraised the actual value of property essentially identical to the
4

The Tax Commission's Final Decision simply recites that the assessment was "based on a
five year class life" (Final Decision at 2) and then concludes (without explication) that "the five
year class life . . . is the proper valuation method for the subject property." Final Decision at 6.
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property at issue. Second, from two individuals who had operated "rent-to-own11 businesses for
numerous years. One of these witnesses was also certified as an expert at the hearing, and the
other witness was Action's President during the audit period. Action's President was familiar
with and had participated in acquiring, selling and accounting for the actual "rent-to-own"
property that was the subject of the audit. See Action's Opening Brief at 33-39.5 The
uncontradicted testimony of these witnesses established that "rent-to-own" property "generally
has an 18 to 24 month useful life." Id. at 37. In addition, once the "life" of the Property is
established it is an easy process to apply that "life" to the original cost of the Property to
determine its taxable value. This is exactly the same process followed by the county assessor
during the audit in applying the Tax Commission's tables to the original cost of Action's
Property. The Respondents, nevertheless, would have this Court ignore such evidence because a
five-year valuation, backed by nothing other than the Commission's own depreciation tables,
purportedly blinds the Court to real-world facts. Nothing in any rule regarding "burden of proof'
(cf. County Brief at 20) requires this result - particularly when the record and the Commission's
own decision are so clearly to the contrary.6

5

Action's witnesses valued "property similar to the 'rent-to-own' property assessed by the
Salt Lake County Assessor" (Action's Opening Brief at 33) because it would have been
impossible to assess the value of "rent-to-own" furnishings in the actual possession of lessees.
Furthermore, and according to the uncontradicted evidence, "rent-to-own" furnishings "simply
[don't] last as long" as regular furnishings and, therefore, may not even have been in existence at
the time of the audit and certainly not at the time of the Commission hearing. R. 824-825.
6

This Court, for example, has noted that appellants "need not engage in a futile marshaling
exercise" when factual findings are "legally insufficient." Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635,
638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). As will be shown below, the Commission's invocation of a five-year
"life" for Action's property is - without question - "legally insufficient" Id.

#63271

8

Except for the Commission's unadorned depreciation table, there is not a scintilla of
factual evidence in the record to support a five-year life for "rent-to-own" property.7 Action will
not burden the Court with a repetition of the record here; the abundant evidence supporting an
18- to 24-month "useful life" for "rent-to-own" property is set forth in Action's Opening Brief at
30-42. Action simply urges the Court to review Appendix F to its Opening Brief, which
summarizes the overwhelming evidence refuting any possibility that "rent-to-own" property has
a five-year "useful life." In this Reply Brief, however, Action does wish to highlight three
important points that it believes are determinative of the valuation question.
First, surveys of "rent-to-own" businesses across the country demonstrate that 92% of all
such businesses reject the use of a "five-year life" to match the cost of the property with its
actual "useful life." See Appendix F at 5-7 (Action's Opening Brief). If, as the Respondents
assert, the "ultimate issue" on valuation "is the fair market value of the property subject to rental
contracts" (County Brief at 14), this Court simply cannot ignore the reality that over 90% of the
"rent-to-own" businesses in the county do not use accounting methods that attribute value to

There is evidence that 65% of "rent-to-own" customers actually purchase the property
(County Brief at 17; R. 967) and that, once such property is "paid off," it is "still in their homes."
Commission Brief at 15; R. 788-789, 793, 799. See also Final Decision at 3 (customers
"continued to use ["rent-to-own"] items after they acquired title from Petitioner by paying the
amount required in the rent-to-own contract"). However, this "evidence," as explained below, is
irrelevant to the question of assessable value. The Tax Commission held that "rent-to-own"
property is "generally disposed o f within "three years." Final Decision at 3. Once it is
"disposed o f (id), "rent-to-own" property is either non-taxable junk (R. 816, 819-920, 827, 984)
or non-taxable household furnishings. Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 2(8). Thus, the fact that
"rent-to-own" property may continue to exist physically in a customer's home beyond two to
three years is simply not probative of any value that may be assessed to Action. The undisputed
record evidence shows that "rent-to-own" property loses all fair market value somewhere
between 18 and 24 months. Action Opening Brief at 37. Furthermore, even under the
Commissions' analysis, Action may not be assessed for the value of "rent-to-own" property once
it has been "disposed of," which "generally" occurs "within three years." Final Decision at 3.
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"rent-to-own" property for a five-year period. The Respondents' stubborn insistence that five
years represents the useful life of "rent-to-own" property - as well as the Tax Commission's
curiously unexplained adoption of the Respondents' unsupported position - simply flies in the
face, not only of record testimony {see preceding paragraph), but of nation-wide business
practice.
Second, the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Congress have now
recognized what the Respondents seek to obscure: "rent-to-own" property does not maintain a
useful life for five years. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 amended Section 168(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code to provide that "rent-to-own" property is to be depreciated over a period
of three years. App. E to Action's Opening Brief (Internal Revenue Code §§ 168(e)(1),
168(e)(3)). Moreover, the Respondents' own witness, the Assistant Director of the Property Tax
Division (App. B to Action's Opening Brief at 151), testified that the IRS1 new position is
entitled to "considerable weight." App. B to Action's Opening Brief at 155. But, despite their
own witness' statement, Respondents have failed to give uncontradicted testimony, nation-wide
business practice or the Internal Revenue Service's determination any weight. This Court must
intervene to safeguard Action's right to a fair assessment rather than assessment by fiat.
Third, and finally, even if this Court were to disregard everything else in Section II of this
Reply Brief, it cannot ignore that the Tax Commission's own Final Decision implicitly
acknowledges that a five-year "life" for "rent-to-own" property is patently erroneous. Article
XIII, § 2(8) of the Utah Constitution provides that "all household furnishings, furniture, and
equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself and family" is exempt from property tax. It is undisputed, therefore, that once Action
has disposed of its "rent-to-own" household furnishings by transferring title to a purchaser,
#63271
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neither Action nor the property owner is subject to assessment or taxation on that property. R.
872; Appendix F to Action's Opening Brief at 5, ^f 18.
The Tax Commission, in its Final Decision, expressly found that:
Petitioner generally disposed of the items at issue within three
years of acquiring them, either through one or more rent to own
contracts, outright sales, or as a write off due to theft or poor
condition.
Final Decision at 3. The County's argument that "rent-to-own" property continues to have "life"
after being disposed of by Action fails to recognize that any continuing "life" in the hands of a
consumer is a non-taxable use and that the Commission's personal property tables could not have
accounted for this non-taxable use because those tables are based upon studies of the taxable,
commercial use of personal property and are intended to be used in valuing the taxable,
commercial use of personal property, not its use as household furnishings. In this case, the
commercial use of Action's Property ended when Action sold to a consumer within three years.
In light of this finding, it is simple error to attribute a "useful life" longer than three years to any
of Action's "rent-to-own" property.
As the Tax Commission recognized, Action disposes of its "rent-to-own" property within
three years, either by selling it (and thereby rendering the property non-taxable, Utah Const. Art.
XIII, § 2(8)), or by writing it off "due to theft or poor condition" (and thereby rendering the
property without taxable value). Final Decision at 3. Action may not be assessed for the value of
property that is no longer taxable under the Utah Constitution. Nor can it be taxed on property
that has no value "due to theft or poor condition." Id. The Tax Commission's decision to assess
Action based on a five-year "life" for "rent-to-own" property is blatantly - and fatally inconsistent with its own factual findings. Accordingly, the Commission's valuation must be
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reversed, and this matter remanded for adoption of a valuation method consistent with the
evidence and the Commission's own findings.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's determination that Action was properly assessed for "escaped
property" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-108(a) should be reversed. In the alternative, this
matter must be remanded to the Tax Commission for adoption of a "useful life" for Action's
"rent-to-own" property that is consistent with the record and the Commission's own findings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December, 1998.
HOLME ROBERTS & OW^N LLP

Mark/K.yBuchi
GaryWihorup
Steven P. Young
Attorneys for Petitioner
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